




I want to accept Bob Ellickson's invitation to debate one of
his middle-level legal policy proposals-specifically, that for reversal
of the nationwide edict that now imposes on all local governments
a rule of universal resident suffrage. As befits the occasion, I allow
this middle-level engagement to draw me on to some cosmic, if
murky, musings about the public/private distinction. I have tried
to rest my critique of Ellickson's argument on unexceptionably
liberal grounds. Towards the end, as the murk descends, I do try
to step outside liberal thought momentarily so as to offer a descrip-
tive statement about it-thus trying, I guess, to catch my own
shadow. I don't know whether Bob Ellickson will approve either
that effort or the descriptive suggestion it yields; but then it's
liberalism, not Ellickson, that I want to defend-specifically, against
the suggestion that liberalism in any way militates against a national
mandate of universal suffrage at the local as well as the national level.
Ellickson argues against a national constitutional rule (imposed
by the Supreme Court in the name of equal protection) requiring
inclusion of renters in municipal electorates on an equal-vote-per-
person basis. More precisely, he urges that this rule would be a
clear economic mistake if the world in actuality conformed to the
perfect competition assumptions of the Tiebout model. I assume
throughout these comments that the Tiebout conditions in fact
prevail. Ellickson's argument, then, seems to fall naturally into
two parts, one focusing on allocative efficiency, the other on dis-
tribution of wealth. Slightly bowdlerized, it goes this way: First,
if we think the only proper aim of political processes is efficiency
in resource allocation, and we are opposed to political redistribu-
tion, then (i) processes should be designed so as to register intensity
as well as direction of policy preferences, and therefore (ii) persons
lacking a concrete stake in local political decisions should have
no voice in making them; and since (iii) renters may well lack
such a stake, then it should be permissible to exclude them from
municipal electorates. Second, even supposing that redistribution
is a proper objective for political processes in general, there is still
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no good reason to admit renters to the municipal franchise, it
being, under the Tiebout conditions, impossible to redistribute
in favor of renters by giving them the municipal franchise, since
whatever expected gain in favorable municipal policies would
accrue to renters by virtue of having the vote would be washed
out by an equivalent rise in the equilibrium price of rental housing
in town.
It seems to me there are several problems in these arguments,
which I'll take up in a somewhat arbitrary order.
First problem: Ellickson takes it as axiomatic that equal per
capita distribution of voting power is a scheme having built-in
redistributive (soak-the-rich) tendencies, so that if you wanted to
avoid political redistribution of pre-political shares of total com-
munity wealth, you would distribute voting power proportionally
to those shares. There is a question, which I leave for later, about
whether, or how, one can talk intelligibly about anything being
redistributed by the working out of a constituted political process.
That question for the moment aside, the claim that equal voting
power distribution is a soak-the-rich scheme ignores the possibility
that the rich, facing looser budget constraints than the poor, can
leverage their greater disposable wealth into political influence
that would tend to make the system go for soak-the-poor policies.
For all anyone can tell a priori, the Robin Hood tendencies of
equal per capita voting power just offset the rich-get-richer
tendencies of political influence buying. (It might be said in
response that the power of wealth to influence political outcomes
is an obvious aspect of the wealth itself, so its exercise in pre-
dictable ways shouldn't be regarded as redistributive. Fine. I
agree with that argument. It denies that the power of wealth is
pre-political rather than politically involved, and by the same
token admits that any Robin Hood tendency in equal per capita
voting power is itself a part of the constituted wealth distribution.
To this matter we shall return.)
Second problem: Ellickson's argument that renters often
shouldn't be included in municipal electorates depends on his
claim that renters often lack much of an economic stake in the
substance of community policies. The strength of this claim
depends on the frequency of a certain pattern of distribution of
policy preferences among renters, that is, the frequency with which
renters prove to be a monolithic political interest group, having
preferences respecting local government policy that are much more
uniform than individually diverse within the renter group.
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An example ,will illustrate. Suppose that in a given munici-
pality there are both homeowners and renters-and, in a randomly
crosscutting dichotomy, there are both "younger" residents (renters
and homeowners) for whom well-financed public schools are the
preemptive budgetary priority, and "older" residents (renters and
homeowners) whose priorities run instead to police patrols, dial-a-
bus, and meals-on-wheels. A priori, there is no reason to imagine
that this municipality's budgetary allocations among these com-
peting claims will have any particular effect on the height or shape
of the total demand curve for rental housing in town, or, there-
fore, on the offering price of the town's marginal renter (who may,
depending on which way municipal policy goes, turn out to be
either an "older" or a "younger" demander).
Under these seemingly realistic conditions, any individual
renter will have a standard economic stake in having his or her
vote counted, no different from a typical homeowner's stake.
Any renter's vote may help tilt the resultant vector of municipal
political decision in a direction favorable to that renter's interests;
and, as we have just seen, there is no reason, in the general case,
to assume anything about how the political outcome will affect
the market-clearing price for local rental housing. (It won't help
to rejoin that renters might, even so, be indifferent to the issue
of renter franchise, because they can see that their conflicting votes
will tend to some degree to offset each other and so, to that degree,
they might as well be virtually represented by their "older" and
"younger" homeowner allies. However good or bad that argument
is, it would be just as good or bad if invoked as a reason for
disfranchising homeowners and letting them be virtually repre-
sented by renters.)
Is this just a quibble about factual realities that doubtless
vary across jurisdictions, adequately covered by Ellickson's conces-
sion that a particular, special renter-like Lee Trevino-may in
fact have some consumer's surplus at stake in local political deci-
sions, and his argument that the answer to the renter-franchise
question should be allowed to vary accordingly? It seems to me
that more than a quibble is involved. Especially in light of con-
siderations yet to be discussed, the constitutional rule of universal
resident franchise should be regarded as settled unless one dis-
covers a serious likelihood of misfit to local conditions. Ellick-
son's perception of such a likelihood depends on a readiness to
perceive renters as a politically monolithic class-that is, to take
the economic status of being a renter as either an indicium or a
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determinant of a person's most urgent local public policy concerns.
To one who resisted such a class-bound view of political experi-
ence, it wouldn't naturally occur to talk of incidence and capitali-
zation effects neutralizing the local policy stakes of a group
identified as "renters."
This situation presents a problem of method in liberal con-
stitutional argument, because the question of renter monolithicity
is (at least in the present state of empirical knowledge) as much
one of political morality as of fact. The question can be put as
follows: When what is to be decided is the political rights of
some set of persons, aren't they owed the fullest possible concern
as individuals having their own interests and concerns, presump-
tively diverse and potentially conflicting? The danger here is that
of steering liberal political economy off towards syndicalism-
assigning political rights on the basis of group or class interests as-
sayed through necessarily crude methods of economic determinism.
Third problem: Even if we concede, arguendo, that the mono-
lithic .view of renter politics is the right one, that is, that all
renters tend to hold the same priorities for local public policy,
it doesn't follow that renters are economically indifferent to the
change in national constitutional law that Bob Ellickson is urging.
All that then follows is that if each municipality in an ideal
Tieboutian open system were to decide for itself whether to admit
renters to the electorate, then no municipality by itself could
successfully transfer wealth to or from its renters by giving or
denying them the vote. (The clearest illustration is the case in
which, at a moment when renters are not allowed to vote any-
where, municipality M admits them to the electorate. On ideal
Tieboutian assumptions, whatever ex ante gain in fiscal residues
accrues to renters in M by virtue of having the vote will be
washed out by an equivalent rise in the market-clearing rental
price of housing in M.)
That, however, isn't the issue Ellickson has chosen to tackle.
His interesting claim isn't that in an on-going decentralized system
of local self-determination regarding renter franchise, renters
would be economically indifferent to how any single municipality
decided. It is, rather, that no economic purpose is served by main-
taining a nationwide rule requiring municipal franchise for renters
everywhere. But as to that question, the Tiebout analysis has
nothing to say; and Ellickson's answer to it seems to be just wrong.
The country can be regarded as a closed system, into and out of
which there is not enough economically induced migration to
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matter. As Ellickson's paper clearly recognizes, in a closed system
voting power distribution is tantamount to-is a mode of-wealth
distribution. But then it follows almost trivially that a shift from
the current nationwide rule requiring renter franchise everywhere,
to a rule of local self-determination of that matter, would con-
stitute a redistribution of wealth away from the country's renters
as an economic class (insofar as it is proper to regard renters as
being an economic class at all).
At work here is a fundamental principle, consistent recog-
nition of which would avoid two other problems I shall soon
mention. Ellickson repeatedly argues as though a person's "eco-
nomic stake" in a broadly competent political process were some-
thing that could be observed and measured separately from the
question of voting-power distribution itself, so that the latter
could be set "efficiently" (or equitably) with reference to the
former. That, we have just noticed, is wrong. The fundamental
analytical principle appears to be that a person's constituted share
of the voting power (in a broadly competent political regime) is
itself an integral aspect of that person's wealth. So when consti-
tutions set voting power shares, they also set wealth shares. In
short, there is in practice no such thing as pre-political wealth.
Fourth problem: Pace Ellickson, it seems impossible to im-
prove a municipal voting system's sensitivity to, or ability to
register efficiently, the intensities of individuals' preferences, by
fiddling with the distribution of voting power within that system.
The fundamental principle shows why. The system's voting-
power distribution is itself a determinant of each participant's
expected stake in its outcomes; and that distribution cannot, then,
be inefficiently related to itself. Again, an illustration may help.
Suppose a person, P, has no property or income subject to local
taxation (P, say, is a penniless mendicant), but somehow has just
got control of a vote-bloc comprising one-third of the total munici-
pal vote (the local charter, for some reason, has just been amended
to give one-third of the votes to P). It certainly isn't the case
that the ex ante value of P's political position is now zero. In
principle, one can calculate that value (that is, the value of the
bribes P can expect to get in exchange for his vote, or of the
pro-P public policies whose enactment P can expect to obtain by
log-rolling) if one knows the total wealth periodically subject to
regulation and distribution by local political decision and has
possession of the right game-theoretic apparatus. Moreover, hold-
ing constant P's voting-power share, one can manipulate decision
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rules, agenda-setting and parliamentary rules, and voting procedures
(quasi-auctions, etc.) so that P and others can register their prefer-
ences (including the intensity dimension) more or less effectively,
leading to more or less efficient allocative outcomes. For example,
it seems that the political system would operate more efficiently
if P and all other vote-holders could sell their votes for cash
rather than be restricted to cumbersome barter (log-rolling).
These other decision rules, not the initial distribution of voting
power (i.e., of wealth ex ante), determine how efficiently voters
can spend their vote wealths by translating them into policy.
Fifth problem: Bob Ellickson suggests that what motivates
the one-person/one-vote doctrine must be an impulse for redis-
tribution. As will be clear, I certainly agree that the doctrine is
(economically speaking) concerned with distribution. What I
deny is that the distribution with which it is concerned is re-.
Since any political constitution, whatever one you choose, is con-
stitutive of a distributional order (i.e., the fundamental principle),
there is no simple descriptive sense in which any political con-
stitution can be redistributive. Of course, any given constitution
may be redistributive vis-t-vis some other particular one regarded
as prior in some sense. Thus one who sees the Avery rule as
redistributive in intention must have in mind some supposedly
prior distributional order.
One possibility would be a Lockean, natural-right, private-
property-freedom-of-contract, market order in which government's
role is strictly limited to that of policeman and, perhaps, correcter
of market failure. Insofar as such an order occupied a prior,
privileged position in thought, the democratic-majoritarian con-
stitution would, indeed, appear to be redistributive. And cer-
tainly it is a mark of "the liberal" in political argument to begin
with some conception of a privileged or pre-political set of
natural-right positions, in which individual self-possession is an
essential premise, relative to which a political constitution can then
be examined and judged for redistributive properties. Equally
a mark of liberal political thought, however, is a Hobbesian per-
ception that in human social life there is no naturally privileged
order, but only the certainty of some emergent structure of social
coercion and restraint, explicit or implicit, some structure in
which the strong restrain the weak, the rulers the ruled, the police
the deviant, or whatever; a perception, as well, that the actually
prevailing structure, or order, is always and inevitably an open
contingency of social determination, formal or informal; and a
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perception that a constitution, then, is just a rule for distributing
"voice" through which individuals may have their says in the
social determinations of the structure of coercion and restraint,
insofar as those determinations happen to occur through organized
deliberation and choice. The democratic, universal-suffrage im-
plications of this latter view are, and long have been, plain and
powerful. They perfectly well explain and justify the national
constitutional rule of universal resident suffrage in all general-
purpose political units; and nothing in Bob Ellickson's argument
even begins to meet them.
There are, then, these two quintessentially liberal perspectives
on politics-corresponding to what Paul Brest this morning called
the "natural right" and the "positivist" perspectives. They have,
I suggest, the following interesting relation to the public/private
distinction: In the natural-right perspective, all concerns are seen
as ultimately, properly private, and none public except contin-
gently and secondarily-the government as instrumentality of
private interest. In the positivist perspective, all concerns are
seen as ultimately, actually public or social, and none private
except contingently and secondarily, by sufferance of social
convention.
How can both perspectives essentially characterize liberalism?
Tempting is the answer that the natural-right perspective, in which
the private subsumes the public, is a "subjective" one; while the
positivist perspective, in which the public subsumes the private,
is an "objective" one. Subjectively, I am certain that the only
locus of value and choice is the individual, and that I am not
thou; objectively, I am certain that we are all in this together.
Is that not a liberal state of mind?
What is not true of liberalism, I submit, is that the natural-
right, private-oriented perspective-the "subjective" one, if you
find that characterization apt-is the normative one for morals or
politics. Liberalism's moral and political norms are not quite
expressible in the competitive vocabulary of private versus public,
or subjective versus objective. Liberalism's normative vocabulary
consists, rather, of notions like person, right, freedom, will, reason,
and law-all of which have both their subjective and objective,
private and public aspects. "Person" connotes individuality and
also membership in a Kingdom of Ends; rights are interpersonal
claims to respect as individuals; freedom is both private and
negative, the absence of arbitrary restraint, and public and posi-
tive, participation in the res publica; will is both particular and
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general; the free will is the one that chooses, individually and
subjectively, to conform itself to objective reason and right; and
the true law, the law of freedom, is the law that both is universal
and that one gives to oneself. No doubt the rhetoric is eighteenth-
century, but all its themes survive, I'm glad to say, in liberal
thought. One may speculate that the persistence in liberal
thought of impulses of both types-the subjective-private and the
objective-public-guarantees that for doctrinal puzzles like state
action no final liberal solution is possible.
Paul Brest said this morning: "It does seem clear that you
can't have it both ways." To me, it seems no less clear that both
ways is the only way you can have it-that you can't have it,
supposing you would want it, just one way or the other.
